RCB, RR deals show how IPL franchises have transformed from a passion buy to an investment bet

The recent sale of two big IPL franchises — RCB (Royal Challengers Bengaluru) and RR (Rajasthan Royals) — has given massive returns to their early investors, somewhat comparable to top-quartile private equity deals in startups. In the initial days when IPL started off, some argued about the value proposition of these IPL teams, saying they were for brand visibility and balance-sheet indulgence.

But the bets on RCB and RR seem to have proven otherwise.

If we look at the IPL franchise journey over the last 15-18 years, the business acumen starts to emulate private equity or growth-stage investing, which is an underwritten asset class, followed by a period of scepticism, then the gradual revenue visibility and finally, institutional capital stepping in.

How has investing in IPL transformed over the years?

An asset class that was once seen as noisy, emotional and hard to underwrite has slowly become legible to serious capital. Revenue streams have deepened, brand power has compounded (take a look at the table below) and, crucially, new buyers now look a lot more like institutional allocators than flamboyant patrons.

This signals how markets re-rate assets once they become tenable.

The headline numbers are hard to ignore

Source: 2008 valuations from Hindustan Times and Bloomberg reports

RCB’s original 2008 franchise value of $111.6 million and its latest reported deal value of about $1.78 billion have been reported by multiple media outlets. Rajasthan Royals’ 2008 value of $67 million and its current $1.63 billion transaction value have also been widely reported.

A 15.9x multiple over 18 years for RCB and a 24.3x multiple for RR translate into annualised returns of roughly 16.6% and 19.4%, respectively.

Put beside PE and VC benchmarks, IPL does not look frivolous

One of the easiest mistakes in sports-business commentary is to focus only on absolute valuation and ignore return context. The better question is this: how do these outcomes compare with what private-capital investors generally hope to earn?

Let’s put this in context by comparing this with what investors usually earn in a private equity or venture capital deal -

And that’s the interesting part.

Cambridge Associates’ benchmark data (March 2025) shows that the US Private Equity Index gave a net return of 14.89% over 10 years; meanwhile, the US Venture Capital Index stands at a 10-year net return of 13.06%.

Bain, citing Preqin and MSCI, says global buyout has averaged an 11% annual growth rate over two decades. PitchBook, meanwhile, reported that venture managers who successfully raised a new fund since 2021 had an average 10-year IRR of 14.4%.

To be clear, this is not a like-for-like comparison. IPL franchise appreciation is an asset-level valuation journey, while Cambridge and PitchBook are reporting fund-level returns, net of fees in some cases. A PE fund also carries diversification, governance structures and distribution mechanics that a single sports asset does not. But as a directional comparison, it is still revealing: the return profile of the best IPL franchises now sits in a range that would not look outlandish in a top-quartile growth equity deck.

That is exactly why institutional money has started paying attention to IPL franchises.

The cap table is the real story

The most telling shift is not the valuation itself. It is the profile of the buyer.

The reported RCB consortium includes Aditya Birla Group, Times Group, Bolt Ventures and Blackstone. Rajasthan Royals has reportedly been acquired by a consortium led by Kal Somani, with Rob Walton and the Hamp family among the investors. On the other side of these deals sit earlier-era owners and investors such as United Spirits in RCB and, in RR’s case, long-associated shareholders including Manoj Badale, RedBird Capital and Lachlan Murdoch-linked capital.

This is what market maturation looks like. In the early years, IPL ownership had the feel of risk capital before the model was fully proven. The middle years were about validation: media rights, sponsorship depth, fan loyalty, and category creation. What we are seeing now is institutionalisation. New buyers are not underwriting sentiment; they are underwriting cash flows, pricing power, scarcity and optionality.

That is a textbook private-capital arc.

Why these assets have re-rated

The answer is not “because cricket is popular.” Cricket was already popular in 2008. What changed is that IPL teams became easier to model.

Houlihan Lokey’s 2025 valuation study put the IPL’s overall business value at $18.5 billion, up 12.9% year-on-year, and its standalone brand value at $3.9 billion. The same study said RCB had become the most valued IPL franchise brand at $269 million.

At the operating level, sponsorship economics have also deepened. WPP Media’s Sporting Nation report said cumulative IPL team sponsorship revenue crossed ₹1,033 crore in 2025, the first time the league had crossed the ₹1,000 crore mark.

Once you have long-cycle media contracts, central revenue visibility, premium sponsorship demand and finite supply of franchises, you are no longer dealing with a vanity asset in the old sense. You are dealing with a scarce, culturally embedded media-and-consumer platform.

That last phrase matters. IPL teams increasingly resemble the kinds of businesses growth investors love: strong top-of-mind recall, monetisable engagement, low substitute value for core fans, and room to layer new revenue streams over an already captive audience. In startup language, they have distribution. In PE language, they have durability.

Why this resonates with startup and growth-stage investors

There is a reason these deals feel familiar to people who have backed consumer internet, media-tech or platform businesses.

First, the brand moat compounds. RCB is the clearest example. For years, it had not converted fan intensity into a title. Yet its commercial appeal kept strengthening. That is a very venture-style phenomenon: the brand and user base can outgrow short-term operating disappointment.

Second, the revenue stack broadens over time. What began as match-day and sponsorship economics is now also about digital audience, merchandising, licensing, women’s cricket adjacency, and broader monetisation of sports IP. That is classic growth-equity behaviour: one asset, multiple monetisation layers.

Third, scarcity does a lot of work. There are only so many IPL seats at the table. Scarcity is a powerful accelerant in private markets because it compresses the time available for entry and magnifies the premium paid for quality assets.

This does not mean every franchise will generate venture-style upside from here. In fact, one could argue the opposite: the really explosive part of the re-rating may already have happened. Institutional buyers often arrive after the “discovery phase,” not before it. But even that is a sign of maturity, not weakness. It suggests IPL teams are shifting from speculative ownership stories to recognisable long-duration assets.

The real takeaway

The smartest way to read these transactions is not as sports-page curiosities. They are evidence that the market now understands IPL franchises in the same language it uses for scaled private assets: compounding, visibility, scarcity, premiumisation and exitability.

And once an asset starts being discussed that way, its investor base changes permanently.

That, more than the billion-dollar headline, is the real story.

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